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By Democratic Audit UK
Two-party contests and the politics of electoral reform: the case
of Taiwan
Taiwan recently took the decision to implement electoral reform, shifting from a single non-transferable vote and
multi-member district system to a first-past-the-post mixed system, with both main parties supporting the decision.
Enuju Chi argues that they did so largely out of self-interest, and that the parties’ goals of maximizing their
respective number of seats led to electoral reforms.
The Taiwanese Parliament (Credit: Jerry Kan, CC BY NC SA 2.0)
The Politics of Electoral Reforms in Taiwan
Taiwan adopted the first-past-the-post (FPTP) mixed system for the Legislative Yuan election in 2005. A mixed
system combines the traditional British style of voting for candidates in single seat districts by FPTP with the
typical continental European election by proportional representation. In 2002, the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) led the electoral reforms and formed a party coalition with the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP and the KMT
judged that the current single non-transferable-vote and multi-member district system (SNTV-MMD) would not
produce the ideal number of seats for them.
After the reform, analyses of it were introduced, explaining the cause and results. Yet, the motivations of political
parties and their strategic interactions were not sufficiently analyzed. What were the motivations of the DPP and
KMT for electoral reform? How did the DPP open and lead the reform? How could the party coalition be
successful in spite of strong opposition from small parties? How could the DPP mobilize people?
What was the motivation of the DPP and the KMT for the electoral reform?
Political parties initiate electoral reform to attain their political goals. The main actors in 2005 electoral reform were
the DPP and the KMT. These two parties wanted to maximize their seats in the Legislative Yuan. The DPP had
been dissatisfied with its achievement under the SNTV-MMD. They could not receive more than 40 percent under
the SNTV-MMD. But, they performed better in other elections such as presidential and mayor elections which
adopted the FPTP system. Based on these experiences, the DPP began to believe that their chances of winning a
majority would improve under the FPTP system.
As for the KMT, the SNTV-MMD had long been a bridging foundation with local factions, and it allowed them to
enjoy a favorable proportionality.However, as the DPP came to develop its electoral skills and new parties were
formed, the SNTV-MMD did not allow the KMT to have a majority anymore. In 1995 election, the KMT gained 46.6
percent of the seats; it was the first election during which they had less than half of the seats. The KMT attributed
it to the SNTV-MMD and concluded that they would recover a majority if the FPTP system were adopted.
How did the DPP open and lead the reform?
Since the DPP proposed its first reform bill in 2002, 11 bills among a total of 19 submitted included a reduction of
seats along with electoral system change during the 5th legislative term from 2002 to 2005. Unlike the electoral
system change, the reduction of seats happened abruptly. Jiang Xue-xun, a DPP legislator, suggested it during
the 2001 Legislative Yuan election campaign and the public, disenchanted by political corruption, welcomed his
idea.
Constitutional revision is an essential process for the reform in Taiwan. For this, a bill needs to be passed by three
fourths of the legislators, with three-fourths in attendance in the National Assembly. At that time, the total number
of legislators was 217; the DPP had 87 and the KMT had 68. Thus, any single party could not pass a bill alone. In
addition, even though the two parties agreed on the reform, 14 more seats were needed to pass the bill.
Whereas the KMT refrained from commenting, the DPP opened the debate. Since coalition building did not make
progress, Lin Yi-hsiung, the DPP ex-party leader, commenced actions to achieve compromises among the parties.
First, he persuaded the opposing forces within the party. Then he proceeded to persuade the KMT to join the
reforms. Lin and his supporters led three street protests in front of the KMT headquarters in December 2003.
Soon after, Lin visited Wang Jin-pyng, the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, to request help with the reform. Wang
adhered to a neutral position but arbitrated a consensus among the parties.
The Constitution Amendment Committee was formed on December 26, 2003. The first Inquire Council was held
on March 10, 2004. The Committee agreed to a preliminary amendment bill effective from the 7th Legislative Yuan
election in 2008, and decided to approve the bill on March 19, one day before the presidential election.
Nevertheless, this plan was abated due to opposition from the small parties.
How could the party coalition be successful in spite of strong opposition from small parties?
After his successful reelection to the presidency, Chen Shui-bian argued that the current Constitution was in need
of comprehensive reform as most of the articles did not meet the contemporary demands. He also supported the
reduction of seats to increase the overall quality of the Legislative Yuan and eradicate political corruption.His
inauguration address delivered this message to the public on May 20, 2004.
Around that time, public sentiment toward politics was extremely negative, particularly due to the ‘3-19 shooting
incident.’Under pressure from the public, the parties formed a coalition again. In May 2004, the DPP and the KMT
resumed discussions. The initial proposal by the DPP included the FPTP mixed system and a reduction of seats
to 150. During negotiations, parties could not come to consensus on the reduced number due to the opposition
from small parties.
At the end of 2004, the 6th Legislative Yuan election took place. In this election, the DPP and the KMT gained
enough seats to pass the bill without cooperation from small parties. Small parties eventually changed their
stance, assuming that the bill would pass although they opposed it. Finally, the 4th National Assembly passed a
bill to revise ‘Article 4 of the Constitution on the Republic of China’ on June 7, 2005. All 201 legislators who
attended the assembly agreed to pass. After the reform, the electoral system changed to the FPTP mixed system
and the total number of seats was reduced from 225 to 113.
How could the DPP mobilize the people?
Benoit posits that the electoral system is able to change when a party coalition forms with the power to alter
electoral rules and when each party in the coalition expects to benefit by gaining more seats under the new
system. In Taiwan, the DPP and the KMT successfully formed a coalition with the expectation of seat
maximization. Additionally, Katz found that ‘public outrage’ was a common factor in all electoral reforms.Public
anger concerning current politics triggers reform controversy and gives legitimacy to the reformist.
Public outrage in Taiwan also triggered some reform-minded KMT politicians in the mid-1990s and the DPP
politicians in the early-2000s to push for electoral reforms. Due to public anger after the 2004 presidential election,
any politician who raised objections to the reforms was criticized as being unjust.In this vein, Wang Jin-pyng
pointed out that populism was the main driving factor for the success of the reform.
As a matter of fact, the public did not fully understand what the FPTP mixed system was. According to the survey
conducted by TVBS in 2004, 40 percent did not know what the FPTP mixed system was but 76 percent supported
seat reduction. Thus, the public supported the electoral reform based on the simple idea that the reforms could
punish corrupt politicians. And the DPP gathered support for the reform by stimulating and mobilizing this public
sentiment for their political purpose.
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